BRIGHT AND SHINING LIES (from The Polystyrene Cantos—a work in progress)

For I can understand people believing in neither God nor Devil, or in God but not the Devil, or believing in both.

But to believe in the Devil but not God is willfully perverse; yea, diabolical.

And thus it is with these people who preach inevitabilities to us, said inevitabilities always being, for some unexamined reason, catastrophes, cataclysms, collapses; plague, famine, war and death—never is the “inevitable” some good thing.

Distrust these people, good reader, distrust them immensely.  Yea, even when their warnings are sound and to be heeded: distrust these people, I say.

For Lucifer has his proud lackies in every corner of the world and the imagination.

And it is not for nothing he was named Lucifer.

Lucifer and his bright and shining lies,

that blind the eyes.

THE GOOD LIFE AND METAPOLITICS

So often the trap that people fall into in what might be called politics at the highest level—let us call it metapolitics—is that they consider “the good life,” that is, the best life one might conceivably lead, as inherently limited in the number of people who can live it.

The motivations for this limitation may not be conscious.  They may consist of an elitist pride, or a profound pessimism clinging desperately to a pre-existing rejection of whatever is said to be “too good to be true.”

And examples may be Nietzsche, for one, for whom the good life could only ever be enjoyed by “we few proud spirits,” living amidst and served by relative herd animals.  Another example would be Christian infernalism, which clings angrily to a need that some be lost to God forever.  Excuses for infernalist nonsense, supposedly scriptural or rational, are pressed forward with great energy or even assumed, with great ease, to be true.

GOOD, EVIL, AND ABSURDITY

“The Lord God made trees spring from the ground, all trees pleasant to look at and good for food; and in the middle of the garden he set the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.”  Genesis 2:9

What is meant in the Genesis story about the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil?”

The eating of the fruit is often called a “loss of innocence”: a cringeworthy and patronizing phrase if ever there was one.  “Loss of innocence” implies not simply a plunge into moral guilt (or a feeling of guilt) but a loss of ignorance: that is, the gaining of knowledge.  In this case, Adam and Eve learn about good and evil that already existed, apparently, but the idea is it would have been best to remain ignorant.

This would imply that paradise as Adam and Eve experienced it was not paradise, even before they ate the apple, but a kind of “fugitive and cloistered” paradise, (a la Milton) a diminished existence which owes (perhaps shamefully) its bliss to the avoidance of certain realities.  (Thus, we hear sometimes the idea of the “fortunate fall.”)

But this perception of a diminished paradise is false from a Christian point of view, which does not see evil as an inherently necessary element in what would amount to a cosmic dualism.  Everything God has made, according to Genesis, is “good.”  Of course, there is the serpent who gets the ball of evil rolling, and there is no implication he is self-created or extant before God’s creation.  Still, it seems odd that he comes as if out of nowhere, “more crafty than any wild creature that the Lord God had made” (Genesis 3:1) unexplained.  If he represents some Principle of Evil essential to the ordering of God’s creation, you’d think he would have been explicitly mentioned in the creation narrative.

Even at this point, therefor, evil is a mystery: such an important thing seems not to be created by God, but by the same token, not in competition with him, as of some equal power.

It indeed seems the case in our day-to-day lives that evil is necessary to good, and that we cannot even imagine (let alone make) a world where this is not so.  Ursula K. LeGuin’s “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” is a fascinating short story about this, showing that even to imagine a perfect world is thwarted by the necessity of bringing in problems of one sort or another.  Also, attempts even to imagine a perfect paradise end inevitably in visions of eternal boredom.

But we must keep in mind that the eating of the fruit, the “knowledge,” results in the eviction from paradise.  The “knowledge” of good and evil may well be the “knowledge” that evil is necessary; but this knowledge is post-lapsarian, and therefor must be suspect.  How does the post-lapsarian mind begin to understand the pre-lapsarian world?  The fact is, we cannot imagine how two people in perfection could fall.  This is because all of us are so inevitably far from perfection we cannot imagine it.  We cannot put ourselves in the position of Adam and Eve, because our decisions for good or evil come in the struggle between the two.  A bad decision outside this context (i.e. one made in perfect innocence) is simply a mistake.  But a bad decision after the inner conflict of good and evil is sin.  We post-lapsarian people already know the difference between good and evil: that is how we are capable of choosing evil, or sin.  Adam and Eve apparently chose to sin before knowing what it was.  They sinned innocently.  This, to us, is absurd.

Which is exactly what it should be.  How can evil “make sense” except in a world where it is already well established, where its propaganda is so wired into the human heart and mind that even the best of us cannot construct even in imagination a world without it?  In paradise evil cannot “make sense,” if paradise is to exist at all as such.

Again, this strikes us as absurd too.  But that is because we are living in a world of evil, and therefore absurdity.

 So we must see all tales of the unfallen world as tales of a foreign country whose language is so incomprehensible to us the story must be told in our own language, and therefor falsified.  What must be translated but cannot be translated must be a “stab at truth, and a lie” (to use a phrase from Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49).  The “loss of innocence” is perhaps some acquisition of knowledge to the fallen world, but in absolute, that is, true terms, this loss of innocence is the gaining of ignorance.  The “knowledge of good and evil” was not just a bad thing to choose, it is a lie.  It is a lie we cannot see beyond to the truth it obfuscates.  We cannot even imagine this truth.  We can know only that the “knowledge” is a lie.

The story of the fall from the Garden of Eden is therefor absurd.  Exactly.  The story itself is telling us this quite deliberately.  In so far as the story must “explain” the fall of humanity into sin and death it must be absurd, or it turns Judaism and Christianity into a dualism where God needs evil, and evil is therefor not evil, but simply a cosmic necessity.

The tale therefor carves out a space in our consciousness for God’s holiness, absolute sovereignty, and absolute perfection, proclaiming this to be the case, creating the idea of God in our minds as he created the universe, and making no claim that we can make sense of this.  This might be seen as where faith comes in.

Of the two entities, of the world and religion, one of them is mad, therefore–the Abrahamic religions are mad in their assertion of God’s perfect goodness and sovereignty, or the world itself is mad in an airtight reason that makes evil essential.  The Abrahamic project can be seen as a fantastic bid for idealism in the popular sense of that word.  Does one have the faith for it?  And will this faith pull absurdity into theology?  I think it does, and I think it should.

After all, theology is about God, of whom theologians say he cannot be understood.  Should we therefor be surprised?

And what are the implications of pulling absurdity into theology?  A good question.  Another good question is this: what is the alternative?

THE BODY OF CHRIST AND INDIVIDUALISM

The doctrine of eternal damnation helped create the concept of the individual.  The overarching embrace of the Roman Catholic church held forth the promise to this now terrified individual the possibility of salvation within the body of an eternal collective, the Church.

But this same church held out also the threat of damnation, which threat itself alienated, fragmented the collective more deeply into numerous individuals.  In the midst of a tendency to threaten us with damnation and then wink and say slyly, “just be good, take communion, and don’t worry about it,” up rose Luther who took damnation very seriously, and Protestantism became the struggle of individuals not to be damned, but in the midst of this struggle individualized even further the organs of Christ’s body.  Increasingly, as the obsession with individual damnation became more intense and conscious, the body of Christ fragmented into Catholic and Protestant, and then into countless Protestant denominations.  Much of the conflict between the two churches was over this: how shall the individual be saved?  Just as the first step – one might argue – to the Nazi holocaust was the unquestioned assumption (in the 19th century, before there was even a Nazi party) that there was such a thing as a “Jewish Problem,” after which much ink would be spilled over what, specifically, the “problem” was and what to do about it, the Christian holocaust against the soul began with the assumption that there was a soteriological problem on the individual level.

Once this coup was achieved, it was simply a matter of time before any powerful or empowering vision of a Christian Collective was increasingly weakened, disempowered to the point where the church could become a mishmash of angry, frightened, depressed, or indifferent individuals who cannot stand up to the world, who see the Kingdom of God as none of their business, and see politics as being beneath the contempt of religiously minded people or merely an authoritarian meddling in the rights of those not in the same faith.  “Where is the body of Christ?” one might ask them, and if they answer what they truly think, it would be this: “elsewhere.”

Thus does our conception of the individual take root in the mysterious and thoughtless rejection of the doctrine of universal salvation, become exacerbated under Roman Catholicism with its avoidance of the issue, and made worse with Protestantism. 

Is it any wonder that Protestantism, if it played its role in the birth of capitalism as per Max Weber—and I believe it did—should thereby have given forth the launching pad for the next and most extreme and destructive stage of individualism: capitalism?

In the meantime, who was left to take up the mantel of the collective self since the church had cast it off?  Communism (in the broad and correct sense of that word, not the perverted “communism” of the Soviet Union) whose efforts were often heroic and, yes, loving, was left with this task.

But this collective body in communism was conceived not as the body of Christ, for the Christian churches had turned that conception into a corpse of itself to be venerated in a tomb far from empty, and which was by  no means allowed to be site of a rebirth on or kin to this Earth.  Truly, the Body of Christ was to be a neverlandish affair entirely, the business of God alone.  The churches carried away this body and deprived and secularized and thereby disabled the promising bloom of the collective subject known as communism.

Thus was the church deprived of its earthly reality and communism of the soul it might have had, the church becoming thereby a ghost, and communism a corpse.  What was to be the marriage of Heaven and Earth was abandoned.

The church and the communists were conceived then as natural enemies when they are by nature one and of the same collective.

But tragically, whenever communism failed, especially ethically, this failure was attributed to its atheism and to its belief in the collective.  The first of these criticisms has truth in it, but not in the way the critics think.  The second criticism is a lie.

MONDAY’S ELECTION: GO LEFT, CANADA

Claims have been made lately that in the upcoming tussle between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party in Canada, the NDP will do badly at the polls.

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that this prediction is well founded.  That is, let us suppose for the sake of argument that the bourgeoisie are not blowing smoke up our asses to convince us, as they usually want to, that nothing even remotely leftist can possibly succeed.

What are we to make of this impending slaughter of this furthest left of our major parties, a party which, even at that, is scarcely Left and does not dare to be socialist?

Take a look at what has been happening in the U.S. for years.  In order to prevent Republican victories, progressives and leftists of various sorts have been saying that while the Democrats have their serious faults (proxy war and genocide spring to mind) the Republicans are worse.  This is the “lesser of two evils” argument .  I myself have been undecided sometimes about this line of thought.  I admit that had I been an American, I would have voted Democrat in the last election.  Was it not so paramount that the Republicans be defeated that even the execrable Democrat party was eminently preferable?  Is not the increasing madness since the inauguration an indication of just what a catastrophe it is that the Democrats did not win the Whitehouse?

Undoubtedly, Republican victory has not made anything better (even the promise of peace in Ukraine seems to fade with every passing announcement) and it has made many things a great deal worse.  But counter to the “lesser of two evils” argument, which has been made for many years, is the fact that following the “lesser of two evils” practice makes that lesser evil more and more evil, with every passing election.  Abandoning human principles on the basis that you are still better than your enemy seems to mean that while your enemy charges further and further through the gates of hell to embrace the devil, you, for all your intentions, end up chained to your enemy, and following at every step.  But perhaps, when you finally meet the Lord of Darkness, you will embrace him not quite as tightly as your enemies do?

One advantage Canada has is that we actually have a viable NDP.  And while it has never taken power in a federal government, it has sometimes had sufficient muscle to influence that government significantly, and has not infrequently won provincially.

But if we quash this party on April 28, though I reject any cowardly fatalism that would call this defeat permanent, we will be strengthening the Right in Canada—ironically, in our attempt to weaken it.

How shall we fight capitalism in its current Trumpist manifestation?  Why, smash the closest thing we have to a Left, of course, what could make more sense?

If the NDP is sidelined to insignificance, Canada will be left in a Yankee-like spiral of “the lesser of two evils.”  Our “democracy” will be democracy only for those who do not want to vote Left under any circumstances.  Our “democracy” will be, in effect, bourgeois democracy: a choice between two factions of increasingly destructive capitalism.

Thus do we allow capital to make the rules.  No wonder it keeps winning.

A NOTE FROM MICHAEL LÖWY’S FIRE ALARM

I just finished reading Michael Löwy’s Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History,” but not without coming across, in the endnotes, this most interesting comment (p. 136, Verso 2016):

As Miguel Abensour rightly observes, it is not utopia that is generative of totalitarianism, but a society without utopianism that is in danger of becoming a totalitarian society, caught up, as it is, in the dangerous illusion of completion.  See M. Abensour, L’Utopie, de Thomas More à Walter Benjamin (Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2000), p. 19.  Abensour argues that the hatred of utopia is a ‘repetitive symptom which, from generation to generation, affects the defenders of the existing order, who are prey to the fear of otherness’.

This strikes me as entirely true.  I have often heard it stated (but don’t recall it ever being argued in any detail) that revolutions become violent because the revolutionaries degenerate into a rage when they cannot bring about a utopia, and begin instead to destroy as much as they can of what is.  Rather, I suspect it is far more often the case that reforms or revolutions become violent when they are steadfastly, even violently resisted in their most moderate and reasonable demands.

Do we not live in a violently anti-utopian age?  Has not capitalism discarded its professed idealism of liberty and prosperity for all to reveal what has been there all along for those paying attention: nihilism, cynicism, a truculent worship of power? 

BYUNG-CHUL HAN AND CHRISTIAN HOPE

In chapter two of his recent The Spirit of Hope (2024) Byung-Chul Han asserts the following:

“Christian hope does not lead to idle passivity.  Rather, it pushes people to action by stimulating them to imagine new ways of acting, and by arousing ‘inventiveness . . . in breaking with the old and coming to terms with the new’. [Jürgen Moltmann]  This hope does not ‘flee the world’; it ‘strains after the future’. [Jürgen Moltmann]  Its essence is not a quietist withdrawal but the ‘cor inquietum’, the restless heart.  Hope neither leaves out nor leaves aside the world.  Rather, it confronts the world in its full negativity and files its objections.  Thus, it nourishes the spirit of revolution.  ‘Always the Christian hope has had a revolutionary effect in this sense on the intellectual history of the society affected by it.’ [Jürgen Moltmann]  The determination to act is inherent in the spirit of hope.  Whoever hopes is inspired by the new, by the novum ultimum.  Hope dares to take the leap towards a new life.”  (italics in original)


Compare this powerful and positive vision with the usual maundering about “the end times” which so many Christians dutifully bleat, a view which is parallel to what is commonly and properly called “Crosstianity”: a vision wherein the Crucifixion is focused on to the exclusion of the Resurrection.  In our “end times” wailing, we see catastrophe ahead, but the coming Kingdom afterwards merely as a forlorn deus ex machina, and that, even, only as a minor footnote to the apocalypse.  The Kingdom of God, as so many Christians imagine it, has no continuity with our world.  No, in this bloodless, faithless view, there shall be no resurrection of humanity, only an extermination and subsequent replacement!

REALISTS AS LACKEYS

The “realists” claim they can see what the idealists can not, or which the latter even flee from seeing.  But curiously, it seems to be the idealists (who are, on the whole, the most likely to question capitalism’s supposed necessity or inevitability) who are most likely to ask why things are going so grimly: what is behind it all?  The “realists” scrupulously avoid asking about the causes of our current problems.  In that sense, they are not realistic at all: they do not look for the reality behind reality.  They do not want to get too close to ultimate causes, whatever they may be.

Primo Levi quotes a guard at Auschwitz as saying, “hier ist kein warum” (here there is no why).

It might also be said that behind the authoritative veil of the cynical-mystical “realist” and his deification of darkness and pain is the snivelling lackey: the first to screech that the emperor is very well clothed indeed.  So close your eyes, underlings, and continue your swaggering!  What else do you have to offer?

SLUMMING

Let religion not be the practice of attempting to fulfill genuine needs with promissory notes

Religion is the recognition of a need to reconcile irreconcilable opposites, and the attempt to do so.  This practice is the necessary result of a fallen world.

If Christ is not fully one of us, whoever else he is, let us have nothing to do with him.  If he is not fully one of us, let him reign on his distant throne.  If he is not fully one of us, then we have simply pedestalized him, as Alan Watts says, and he is of no use to us.  He is the boss’s son, and for all his vaunted righteousness was always guaranteed success and a special status, whence he judges the rest of us.  He holds out the promise of salvation but in no way gives it.

It is of little use if he is not a sinner as we are.  If he was simply treated as if he were a sinner, he still is not one of us.  (Yet, how can he be a sinner?  This also is intolerable.  So we have a mystery, one of the irreconcilable opposites I speak of.  Or is this instead an out and out contradiction?)

If he is one of us, then the theosis in its most fundamental sense has already taken place even if it is not complete.  This is what we need, not a promise of union with God.

If he is not fully one of us, then he was just a god out slumming.

Man is that creature that needs union with God.

With theology one demands the impossible

LIBERATING THE LEFT FROM “WOKEISM”

A Review of Left is not Woke by Susan Neiman; Polity Press, 2023

So much of the “anti-woke” criticism that appears in our culture is actually a thin disguise for an attack on anything left, whether “woke” or not.  Susan Neiman, however, identifies herself immediately in Left is Not Woke as a leftist and a socialist, adding a much needed perspective to the discussion of “wokeism.”

Immediately, she states that this book is not “a call for bipartisanship, or a screed against cancel culture.  Nor will I speak of the liberal virtue of working to understand those who do not share your views, though I think it’s a virtue” (1).

Can woke be defined?  It begins with concern for marginalized persons, and ends by reducing each to the prism of her marginalization.  The idea of intersectionality might have emphasized the ways in which all of us have more than one identity.  Instead, it led to focus on those parts of identities that are most marginalized, and multiplies them into a forest of trauma…. In the focus on inequalities of power, the concept of justice is often left by the wayside.

Woke demands that nations and peoples face up to their criminal histories.  In the process it often concludes that all history is criminal.

What’s confusing about the woke movement is that it expresses traditional left-wing emotions: empathy for the marginalized, indignation at the plight of the oppressed, determination that historical wrongs should be righted.  Those emotions, however, are derailed by a range of theoretical assumptions that ultimately undermine them.  (5-6)

Though one might be well advised to put the word “woke” into quotation marks, in acknowledgement of its frequent use as a simple term of abuse for anything left, liberal, or progressive, Neiman’s book, is about a tendency that has, in the author’s view, driven the left down various rabbit holes that deprive it of its traditional energy, justice, and insight.

What concerns me most here are the ways in which contemporary voices considered to be leftist have abandoned the philosophical ideas that are central to any left-wing standpoint: a commitment to universalism over tribalism, a firm distinction between justice and power, and a belief in the possibility of progress.  All these ideas are connected.  (2)

These three points are central to this invigorating little book and constitute the sort of insight much of the current establishmentarian blather against “woke” has overlooked.  The five chapters of the book consist of introductory and concluding chapters, plus a chapter for each of the three central points.

Neiman might have paid more attention to the “considered to be leftist” angle.  Are the woke really a left that has lost its way, as Neiman seems to believe, or is woke really more the product of what might be called “liberal” thought?  I sometimes think of liberals as people who share the same values as conservatives more often than either knows, but who have too much of a heart to take them to their logical, brutal conclusions.  For example, both sides exalt ideas of property rights as practiced in capitalism, but the liberals are more sensitive to how these rights interfere with other rights and injure public prosperity.  The liberal, therefor, is more likely to favour unions for example, but would be appalled that anyone other than a capitalist might be competent to own and run a major enterprise.

But perhaps I quibble, because Neiman points out simply, “the woke themselves have been colonized by a row of ideologies that properly belong to the right” (127).

“Woke” started out as a positive term used by the woke to refer to their own way of looking at things, but now “woke” as a word is largely the pejorative offspring of the equally pejorative “politically correct.”  It seems the latter term is being retreaded or replaced by the former, having been worn out from its over thirty years of faithful service to the righteous cause of powerfully insinuating that anything left, liberal, or progressive is not only inherently pharisaical, but the only ideology in town allowed to speak, and one that only the bravest dare criticize.  In reality, of course, for over 30 years nothing has been more “politically correct” than not being “politically correct.”

Suffice it to say that in order to establish a ground for a more useful and accurate criticism of the woke, it is enough to signify what “left” means, and this I think Neiman does well.

The first chapter after the introduction is called “Universalism and Tribalism.” 

Let’s begin with the idea of universalism, which once defined the left; international solidarity was its watchword.  This was just what distinguished it from the right, which recognized no deep connections, and few real obligations, to anyone outside its own circle.  The left demanded that the circle encompass the globe.  That was what standing left meant. … What united was not blood but conviction—first and foremost the conviction that behind all the differences of time and space that separate us, human beings are deeply connected in a wealth of ways.  To say that histories and geographies affect us is trivial.  To say that they determine us is false.  (11)

Neiman sees universalism as having come under attack because of its being associated with a “fake universalism” involving “the attempt to impose certain cultures on others in the name of an abstract humanity that turns out to reflect just a dominant culture’s time, place, and interests.  That happens daily in the name of corporate globalism, which seeks to convince us that the key to human happiness is a vast universal mall” (23).  It is in this chapter that Neiman begins her defense of the Enlightenment, attacking the attitude that it can be dismissed as simply a bunch of hypocritical, periwigged white men.  The practice of getting back to universal values, and being unafraid of accusations of trying to dominate a given discourse thereby, is a breath of fresh air.  I am reminded of Todd McGowan’s Universality and Identity Politics and its even more detailed discussion of this issue.

Much of the third chapter, “Justice and Power,” is given over to an argument against the work of Michel Foucault.  In brief, Neiman asserts that the powers of the world have so often claimed noble intent in their actions, while actually being motivated by the baser elements of human nature, that “the line between power and justice is increasingly ignored” (78).  But while Foucault has often exposed the hypocrisy of power, he also sees it as “the driving force of everything” (63).  “Power” in Foucault’s understanding, according to Neiman, “even enfolds resistance, which reinforces power.  It’s power all the way down” (63).  She refers to a public debate between Foucault and Noam Chomsky from the 1970s, after which Chomsky stated that Foucault was “the most amoral man he ever met” (66). 

In this same context, evolutionary psychology also comes in for a critique because of its assumptions that human behavior must always be self-interested.  Neiman points out that evolutionary psychology did not start off as a product of the left.  Rather, initially the left objected to it.  But now, it “provides the default assumptions about human behavior accepted by most people regardless of political standpoint” (89).

“She did it because it was right” was once, by itself, an explanatory statement—though whether that was really the reason she did it was always open to question.  By the late twentieth century, such statements no longer counted as explanatory, but required deconstruction revealing some form of self-interest as the real driving force.  None of the thinkers who contributed to making this assumption seem natural has asked the historical question about their own premise: might that assumption itself be part of a conceptual framework constructed during the twentieth century?  The supposition that any genuine explanation of human behavior must penetrate high-flown, idealistic descriptions to reach the self-interested wheels that turn us is itself a piece of ideology whose history has yet to be written.  (89)

These thoughts give rise to what Neiman presents as an at least partial explanation for Donald Trump’s popularity:  unlike the rest of us, he is truly the sort of human being evolutionary psychology claims we all are.  His followers

admire his authenticity.  With apologies to Abraham Lincoln, he functions as a license to act according to the worst devils of our nature.  The baleful fascination he exerts over the many who loathe him is a result of his singularity: it’s perpetually astonishing to observe a human being who behaves so differently from the rest of us.  By taking the trouble to be a hypocrite, George W. Bush paid compliments to virtue.  No wonder even those who wanted him jailed for war crimes feel occasional nostalgia. (91)

Finally, the fourth chapter, “Progress and Doom” tells us at the outset, “there’s no deeper difference between left and right than the idea that progress is possible.” (92).  Here again, Foucault comes in for a drubbing.

So how did Michel Foucault become the godfather of the woke left?  His style was certainly radical, but his message was as reactionary as anything Edmund Burke or Joseph de Maistre ever wrote.  Indeed, Foucault’s vision was gloomier than theirs…. You think we make progress toward practices that are kinder, more liberating, more respectful of human dignity: all goals of the left?  Take a look at the history of an institution or two.  What looked like steps toward progress turn out to be more sinister forms of repression…. Once you’ve seen how every step forward becomes a more subtle and powerful step toward total subjection, you’re likely to conclude that progress is illusory.  How far Foucault believed this himself is an open question, but it’s certainly the view most have drawn from his work.  (93-94)

But how much is Foucault the godfather of the left?  Are the attitudes attributed to him really where the woke got them?  I suspect the source is broader, that Foucault is not a singular, original tributary, poisoning the entire river, but part of a larger watershed.

Are there not other reasons for wokeism than Foucault, evolutionary psychology, and poor understandings of the Enlightenment?  In other words, there may be reasons more historical and cultural than the more specifically intellectual sources Neiman is dealing with.  For example, the self-righteousness characteristic of the woke may be at least in part a result of being or siding with the underdog.  If some people are oppressed or marginalized, told constantly that they are not good enough because of their race or sexual orientation, for example, is it so surprising that some should end up aggrandizing themselves or putting on airs because of their sufferings?  Neiman wisely points out that while being oppressed should be nothing to be ashamed of, it is no virtue either.  But the manifold disappointment the left has faced since the sixties puts great pressures on people whether they are familiar with the work of Foucault or not.

There are many things philosophy is good for; one is uncovering the assumptions behind your most cherished views and expanding your sense of possibility.  “Be realistic” sounds like common sense, but hidden behind it is a metaphysics that underlies many a political position, a whole set of assumptions about what’s real and what’s not, what’s doable and what’s imaginable.  You can translate the advice to be realistic quite simply: lower your expectations.  When you take such advice, what assumptions are you making about reality?  (123)

Indeed.  “Realism” may well be the ideology of our time.  And it is time for the giant to be slain.  Perhaps the most insidious invasion of the left by its enemies is in the erosion of hope.  Hopelessness, though usually not explicit, is the real political correctitude of our times.  Bruno Bettelheim, though he may not have been by any means the most astute explicator of politics, and though his theories of autism have long since been rejected, may have been on to something when he saw a link between the philosophy of the concentration camps and the darker elements of seemingly apolitical human psychopathology in the motto, “you must never hope that anything can change.”

Left is not Woke is a book that is highly useful in revivifying leftist thought.  It gets down to what the assumptions are behind wokeism much better than its more conservative critics could do.  Neiman’s book is lucid, insightful, and very timely.