LIBERATING THE LEFT FROM “WOKEISM”

A Review of Left is not Woke by Susan Neiman; Polity Press, 2023

So much of the “anti-woke” criticism that appears in our culture is actually a thin disguise for an attack on anything left, whether “woke” or not.  Susan Neiman, however, identifies herself immediately in Left is Not Woke as a leftist and a socialist, adding a much needed perspective to the discussion of “wokeism.”

Immediately, she states that this book is not “a call for bipartisanship, or a screed against cancel culture.  Nor will I speak of the liberal virtue of working to understand those who do not share your views, though I think it’s a virtue” (1).

Can woke be defined?  It begins with concern for marginalized persons, and ends by reducing each to the prism of her marginalization.  The idea of intersectionality might have emphasized the ways in which all of us have more than one identity.  Instead, it led to focus on those parts of identities that are most marginalized, and multiplies them into a forest of trauma…. In the focus on inequalities of power, the concept of justice is often left by the wayside.

Woke demands that nations and peoples face up to their criminal histories.  In the process it often concludes that all history is criminal.

What’s confusing about the woke movement is that it expresses traditional left-wing emotions: empathy for the marginalized, indignation at the plight of the oppressed, determination that historical wrongs should be righted.  Those emotions, however, are derailed by a range of theoretical assumptions that ultimately undermine them.  (5-6)

Though one might be well advised to put the word “woke” into quotation marks, in acknowledgement of its frequent use as a simple term of abuse for anything left, liberal, or progressive, Neiman’s book, is about a tendency that has, in the author’s view, driven the left down various rabbit holes that deprive it of its traditional energy, justice, and insight.

What concerns me most here are the ways in which contemporary voices considered to be leftist have abandoned the philosophical ideas that are central to any left-wing standpoint: a commitment to universalism over tribalism, a firm distinction between justice and power, and a belief in the possibility of progress.  All these ideas are connected.  (2)

These three points are central to this invigorating little book and constitute the sort of insight much of the current establishmentarian blather against “woke” has overlooked.  The five chapters of the book consist of introductory and concluding chapters, plus a chapter for each of the three central points.

Neiman might have paid more attention to the “considered to be leftist” angle.  Are the woke really a left that has lost its way, as Neiman seems to believe, or is woke really more the product of what might be called “liberal” thought?  I sometimes think of liberals as people who share the same values as conservatives more often than either knows, but who have too much of a heart to take them to their logical, brutal conclusions.  For example, both sides exalt ideas of property rights as practiced in capitalism, but the liberals are more sensitive to how these rights interfere with other rights and injure public prosperity.  The liberal, therefor, is more likely to favour unions for example, but would be appalled that anyone other than a capitalist might be competent to own and run a major enterprise.

But perhaps I quibble, because Neiman points out simply, “the woke themselves have been colonized by a row of ideologies that properly belong to the right” (127).

“Woke” started out as a positive term used by the woke to refer to their own way of looking at things, but now “woke” as a word is largely the pejorative offspring of the equally pejorative “politically correct.”  It seems the latter term is being retreaded or replaced by the former, having been worn out from its over thirty years of faithful service to the righteous cause of powerfully insinuating that anything left, liberal, or progressive is not only inherently pharisaical, but the only ideology in town allowed to speak, and one that only the bravest dare criticize.  In reality, of course, for over 30 years nothing has been more “politically correct” than not being “politically correct.”

Suffice it to say that in order to establish a ground for a more useful and accurate criticism of the woke, it is enough to signify what “left” means, and this I think Neiman does well.

The first chapter after the introduction is called “Universalism and Tribalism.” 

Let’s begin with the idea of universalism, which once defined the left; international solidarity was its watchword.  This was just what distinguished it from the right, which recognized no deep connections, and few real obligations, to anyone outside its own circle.  The left demanded that the circle encompass the globe.  That was what standing left meant. … What united was not blood but conviction—first and foremost the conviction that behind all the differences of time and space that separate us, human beings are deeply connected in a wealth of ways.  To say that histories and geographies affect us is trivial.  To say that they determine us is false.  (11)

Neiman sees universalism as having come under attack because of its being associated with a “fake universalism” involving “the attempt to impose certain cultures on others in the name of an abstract humanity that turns out to reflect just a dominant culture’s time, place, and interests.  That happens daily in the name of corporate globalism, which seeks to convince us that the key to human happiness is a vast universal mall” (23).  It is in this chapter that Neiman begins her defense of the Enlightenment, attacking the attitude that it can be dismissed as simply a bunch of hypocritical, periwigged white men.  The practice of getting back to universal values, and being unafraid of accusations of trying to dominate a given discourse thereby, is a breath of fresh air.  I am reminded of Todd McGowan’s Universality and Identity Politics and its even more detailed discussion of this issue.

Much of the third chapter, “Justice and Power,” is given over to an argument against the work of Michel Foucault.  In brief, Neiman asserts that the powers of the world have so often claimed noble intent in their actions, while actually being motivated by the baser elements of human nature, that “the line between power and justice is increasingly ignored” (78).  But while Foucault has often exposed the hypocrisy of power, he also sees it as “the driving force of everything” (63).  “Power” in Foucault’s understanding, according to Neiman, “even enfolds resistance, which reinforces power.  It’s power all the way down” (63).  She refers to a public debate between Foucault and Noam Chomsky from the 1970s, after which Chomsky stated that Foucault was “the most amoral man he ever met” (66). 

In this same context, evolutionary psychology also comes in for a critique because of its assumptions that human behavior must always be self-interested.  Neiman points out that evolutionary psychology did not start off as a product of the left.  Rather, initially the left objected to it.  But now, it “provides the default assumptions about human behavior accepted by most people regardless of political standpoint” (89).

“She did it because it was right” was once, by itself, an explanatory statement—though whether that was really the reason she did it was always open to question.  By the late twentieth century, such statements no longer counted as explanatory, but required deconstruction revealing some form of self-interest as the real driving force.  None of the thinkers who contributed to making this assumption seem natural has asked the historical question about their own premise: might that assumption itself be part of a conceptual framework constructed during the twentieth century?  The supposition that any genuine explanation of human behavior must penetrate high-flown, idealistic descriptions to reach the self-interested wheels that turn us is itself a piece of ideology whose history has yet to be written.  (89)

These thoughts give rise to what Neiman presents as an at least partial explanation for Donald Trump’s popularity:  unlike the rest of us, he is truly the sort of human being evolutionary psychology claims we all are.  His followers

admire his authenticity.  With apologies to Abraham Lincoln, he functions as a license to act according to the worst devils of our nature.  The baleful fascination he exerts over the many who loathe him is a result of his singularity: it’s perpetually astonishing to observe a human being who behaves so differently from the rest of us.  By taking the trouble to be a hypocrite, George W. Bush paid compliments to virtue.  No wonder even those who wanted him jailed for war crimes feel occasional nostalgia. (91)

Finally, the fourth chapter, “Progress and Doom” tells us at the outset, “there’s no deeper difference between left and right than the idea that progress is possible.” (92).  Here again, Foucault comes in for a drubbing.

So how did Michel Foucault become the godfather of the woke left?  His style was certainly radical, but his message was as reactionary as anything Edmund Burke or Joseph de Maistre ever wrote.  Indeed, Foucault’s vision was gloomier than theirs…. You think we make progress toward practices that are kinder, more liberating, more respectful of human dignity: all goals of the left?  Take a look at the history of an institution or two.  What looked like steps toward progress turn out to be more sinister forms of repression…. Once you’ve seen how every step forward becomes a more subtle and powerful step toward total subjection, you’re likely to conclude that progress is illusory.  How far Foucault believed this himself is an open question, but it’s certainly the view most have drawn from his work.  (93-94)

But how much is Foucault the godfather of the left?  Are the attitudes attributed to him really where the woke got them?  I suspect the source is broader, that Foucault is not a singular, original tributary, poisoning the entire river, but part of a larger watershed.

Are there not other reasons for wokeism than Foucault, evolutionary psychology, and poor understandings of the Enlightenment?  In other words, there may be reasons more historical and cultural than the more specifically intellectual sources Neiman is dealing with.  For example, the self-righteousness characteristic of the woke may be at least in part a result of being or siding with the underdog.  If some people are oppressed or marginalized, told constantly that they are not good enough because of their race or sexual orientation, for example, is it so surprising that some should end up aggrandizing themselves or putting on airs because of their sufferings?  Neiman wisely points out that while being oppressed should be nothing to be ashamed of, it is no virtue either.  But the manifold disappointment the left has faced since the sixties puts great pressures on people whether they are familiar with the work of Foucault or not.

There are many things philosophy is good for; one is uncovering the assumptions behind your most cherished views and expanding your sense of possibility.  “Be realistic” sounds like common sense, but hidden behind it is a metaphysics that underlies many a political position, a whole set of assumptions about what’s real and what’s not, what’s doable and what’s imaginable.  You can translate the advice to be realistic quite simply: lower your expectations.  When you take such advice, what assumptions are you making about reality?  (123)

Indeed.  “Realism” may well be the ideology of our time.  And it is time for the giant to be slain.  Perhaps the most insidious invasion of the left by its enemies is in the erosion of hope.  Hopelessness, though usually not explicit, is the real political correctitude of our times.  Bruno Bettelheim, though he may not have been by any means the most astute explicator of politics, and though his theories of autism have long since been rejected, may have been on to something when he saw a link between the philosophy of the concentration camps and the darker elements of seemingly apolitical human psychopathology in the motto, “you must never hope that anything can change.”

Left is not Woke is a book that is highly useful in revivifying leftist thought.  It gets down to what the assumptions are behind wokeism much better than its more conservative critics could do.  Neiman’s book is lucid, insightful, and very timely.

ON THE NECESSITY OF A GENERAL RESURRECTION OF THE WORLD

In these grim and dangerous times the forces of darkness conspire to make us despair and write ourselves off.

The problem with a conservative, or should we even say mainstream Christian eschatology, is that it implies that whereas resurrection is understood as overcoming death, as the person coming back from the dead with new life and new existence, thereby defeating death, there is no such equivalent for the world as such. (By “world” here I mean the world God made, and which has been transformed or built upon by us in history for better or worse.)  That is, the commonly held eschatological attitudes seem to imply not that the world will die and be resurrected, but that it will die permanently, and be replaced by a new world.  Though this new Earth may be immortal, the one it replaced will be dead forever.  But in that sense and problematically, death’s victory over the world will be sealed as permanent.  The individual my rise from the grave triumphant, but the world he or she had lived in will have been condemned forever.

Religion thus often exhorts us to be better people, to give over this sin or that one, to be more loving, or faithful, or truthful, or whatever.  It does not claim that moral perfection is possible this side of the grave, but does say improvement is possible, and commanded by God.  But at the same time, any real improvement in the politics of the world, its economic or social structures, is usually rejected by religion as either being in vain, or even outright blasphemous: an attempt to force the coming of God’s kingdom before God’s own good time.

But are our deeds, great and small, in the course of human history of any consequence in the long run, or are they not?  Do we have ultimately no place in the creation as actual creators, or as J.R.R. Tolkien might have put it, sub-creators?  Or must we as a species be stripped clean of all history and reformatted with entirely new programs, rendering the previous ones not only forgotten but vanished without a trace?

I am not talking about “salvation by works,” but the salvation of works.  Do our works, our lives, our history as a species, have meaning or not?  Nor can this question be escaped by asserting our works have nothing to do with our salvation.  Might not works be important in the eyes of God without saving anybody?

If there is not some form of continuity between the dead person or world on the one hand, and the resurrected person or world on the other, there is no resurrection.  Parents having another child after the first one dies is no victory over death, and no salvation of the dead child.  Nor will it undo their grief, no matter how much they may be rejuvenated or rejoice in their new offspring.  The idea of healing the deep family wound simply by replacing the beloved is obscene.

Likewise, there is something profoundly nihilistic in believing in resurrection of the individual, but not of the world.  Individuals do not exist as such, detached from the world, any more than we find healthy rosebushes floating about in outer space.  What makes the rose what it is, is in part its connection to its world via soil, light, water and air, all the surrounding insects and microorganism that are a part of its life.  Likewise, if we are, as St. Paul says, organs in Christ’s body, then it is true as Donne says that “no man is an island, entire of itself.”  For the full salvation of the individual, the salvation or redemption—not mere replacement–of the world is needed.

If there is no new Earth, a resurrected Earth that is, a reborn Earth, then what we have is fertile ground for frustrated and vengeful fantasies of annihilation.  The Christian eschatologist writes for himself permission to look upon the destruction of the world with glee, as if he will be standing aside with hands on hips, nodding in approval as an ancient enemy gets its comeuppance.  (Christian eschatology is far too often a way of allowing a sickening misanthropy hide out in the open.)  We give ourselves permission to shit on the creation, even to destroy it, because, after all, it is doomed to eternal nonexistence in any case.

It is deeply revolting and an offense to reason to assert that while charity to the poor is smiled upon by the Lord, the improvement of economic systems such that such charity is not so much needed is seen as some kind of impiety.

God’s creation was and is good.  And it is to be saved.  And if we as individuals are to be saved, what we have made in this world, however much may have to be cast into the flames either for destruction or purification, was not given into our power to make only for us to make it in vain.

But in effect, with this mainstream eschatology, it is implied that we are to be like transplanted rosebushes.  In so far as we thought we saw God in the world around us, even though we were also conscious of its terrible corruption, we were apparently deluded.

If history is to be wiped out, then it was always and already meaningless.  Everything we have ever done is of no significance.  But if that is so, why the relentless nagging of scripture and conscience to do this thing and not do that thing?

A priority of being over doing I can understand and tend to agree with.  But the annihilation of the deed is nihilism.

ARISTOCRACY

When aristocracy as such became discredited, people still found in themselves a desire, acknowledged or not, to look down on somebody.  It is the old sin of pride.  Just because aristocracy is abolished or muted does not mean its proud and ancient desires disappear.  If they cannot achieve satisfaction in the old political structures, they shall find new ways.

And so, much of the 19th to 21st centuries’ opposition to “modernity,” however defined, may owe some of its existence to the old desire to feel superior. The aristocrat of the spirit looks down on the NOW in the name of the PAST.  He cannot, perhaps even in his own eyes, despise openly in the name of “blood,” or even class, and maintain credibility.  But he can cook up some theory—even one which may have considerable truth in it—wherein he stands by the past over and against the present.  Thus, he can despise all and sundry about him as the benighted commoners in effect, those who do not understand or appreciate the old ways.  This is a source of tremendous satisfaction.  The other type of snob, the one who despises the past in the name of the present, must be content to despise the dead.  It is much harder in this situation to pose as the brave knight living in enemy territory but soldiering on nonetheless.  To cast one’s attack broadly against “modernity” can be to gloat in one’s superiority in the face of an enemy whose power outstrips one’s own (while, in effect, living in no greater danger than anyone else); this is more gratifying to the ego than to gloat over a helpless corpse.

C.S. LEWIS’S PHILOSOPHY OF HELL AND A NEW WORLD

C.S. Lewis never wrote about politics very much, but in the eighteenth letter of The Screwtape Letters he has his devil, Screwtape, say the following:

The whole philosophy of Hell rests on recognition of the axiom that one thing is not another thing, and, specially, that one self is not another self. My good is my good and your good is yours. What one gains another loses. Even an inanimate object is what it is by excluding all other objects from the space it occupies; if it expands, it does so by thrusting other objects aside or by absorbing them. A self does the same. With beasts the absorption takes the form of eating; for us, it means the sucking of will and freedom out of a weaker self into a stronger. ‘To be’ means ‘ to be in competition’.  

This philosophy could be seen as what has always been the dominant politics of the world—or the sin of pride in its structural or corporate manifestation—whether the rulers were soldiers, priests, hereditary aristocrats, or business people.  Capitalism, with its “war of all against all,” its social Darwinism, is the locus of the Devil’s philosophy in the current age.

Many Christians simply accept Churchill’s dictum that history is “just one damned thing after another.”  Whatever he meant by that, they see it as an essentially meaningless and contemptible series of events and eagerly await the Christ to come back and wipe it all out, taking us to heaven.  They are disappointed in life, and want it to be punished.  And for what they imagine to be their admirable otherworldliness, they think they shall be rewarded with a new world that has no connection to and very little similarity to this one.

What is a resurrection?  It is a rebirth, a new person, but a person not entirely discontinuous with the old person.  It is the old person who has died but is transfigured and reborn.  Otherwise, there is no resurrection, but simply the death of one person followed by his or her replacement by another who is entirely someone else.

Thus it is, I believe, with the new Earth that is destined to be born.

The Christian’s approach to history should not be that of an unloving parent troubled by a chronically and seriously sick child, hopefully counting the days down to when that child shall die and the parent be presented with a healthy replacement.  The parent wants the child to be saved, not replaced, and this is what we should want for the world—not just for the individuals within it. 

Much of Christian eschatology, unfortunately, is simply a disguised desire for genocide, geocide, even.

HELL IS POLITICAL

Many of the early Christians were very cheerful, very good, very fearless.  There was a real danger they might have no fear of death; and this would never do.  Christ came to defeat sin and death, and death is a much reduced master if he is not feared.  Fortunately, there was an answer: the Christians’ faith in the resurrection could not be easily shaken; but it could be more easily twisted.

Enter hell.  The solution was simple.  If people do not fear anything in this life because their deepest faith is in the life to come, make that life to come uncertain: not by denying its reality, but by making that reality potentially terrifying.  Tell them that they very well will live forever after they die, but that they must step very carefully in this life or end up in perpetual torment.

And so death, the retreating ancien regime, poisoned the wells for the advancing revolutionaries who were overthrowing him; he re-established his foothold on Earth in the very midst of a church that was to lead the revolution against him.  For now, Christians again lived in fear.  And their fear of the next world gave them all the vices and weaknesses people experience when their fears are only of this one.

The pagan world of the Middle East had believed in a dark and shadowy afterlife, a world of shades and shadows, of ghostly spirits who had forgotten their Earthly lives and wandered forever in gloom.  This miserable fate had been thought to await all but a few privileged ones favoured by the gods for whatever reason.  But now, after the victory of Christ, this shadowy underworld was superseded in its misery and terror by the Christian hell.

Thus it is that in wars and revolutions, the enemy puts up such resistance that one looks back longingly, like the Hebrews in the desert after leaving Pharoah, upon a time that was miserable, but less miserable than now.  Would it not have been better to make bricks without straw under a tyrant than be where we are now?   Would it not have been better to submit to death, its power and propaganda, to be “realistic” and bow to his “natural” reign, than rebel and find ourselves cast into the flames?

But not so fast.  For death never had power to make a hell, only the fear of it.  Death never cast us into the flames but only into the fear of them.  Death has enlisted us against ourselves in his war against us, and we need not commit this self-betrayal.  Nor need we believe that the rise of hell as a propaganda pinion of the Church was ever inevitable, or, even if inevitable, need we see it as anything other than a tremendous bluff, which itself is doomed inevitably to fall.

Hell is decidedly political.