ARISTOCRACY

When aristocracy as such became discredited, people still found in themselves a desire, acknowledged or not, to look down on somebody.  It is the old sin of pride.  Just because aristocracy is abolished or muted does not mean its proud and ancient desires disappear.  If they cannot achieve satisfaction in the old political structures, they shall find new ways.

And so, much of the 19th to 21st centuries’ opposition to “modernity,” however defined, may owe some of its existence to the old desire to feel superior. The aristocrat of the spirit looks down on the NOW in the name of the PAST.  He cannot, perhaps even in his own eyes, despise openly in the name of “blood,” or even class, and maintain credibility.  But he can cook up some theory—even one which may have considerable truth in it—wherein he stands by the past over and against the present.  Thus, he can despise all and sundry about him as the benighted commoners in effect, those who do not understand or appreciate the old ways.  This is a source of tremendous satisfaction.  The other type of snob, the one who despises the past in the name of the present, must be content to despise the dead.  It is much harder in this situation to pose as the brave knight living in enemy territory but soldiering on nonetheless.  To cast one’s attack broadly against “modernity” can be to gloat in one’s superiority in the face of an enemy whose power outstrips one’s own (while, in effect, living in no greater danger than anyone else); this is more gratifying to the ego than to gloat over a helpless corpse.

ACCEPTANCE AND “REALISM”

A Buddhistic or Tollean acceptance of what is is worlds apart from “realism.”  “Realism”–an ideological word if ever there was one–is idolatry towards all negativity in what is.  Realism sneakily and in a cowardly manner (all the while swaggering about—it is impossible to use the word “realism” without at least a hint of swagger) conflates that which simply is with that which is not as we would like it.  To be “real,” something must be opposed to us, thwarting us, and the “realist” therefore is a tough guy who can “face” all this.  Realism is not the honest knowledge or acceptance of something negative, but the denial that anything that is not negative could be entirely real.  Realism is the worship of a dark god, the modern version of a now quaint and rather annoying Satanism.  The stupid vulgarity of pentagrams, animal-headed people, and bloody sacrifice is replaced with an equally vulgar and stupid salute to despair.  Realism is active, arrogant, worshipful failure, and hates or despises all who do not get on board.  The realist, like many who are intimidated and dominated by a bully, is humiliated by the very existence of those who are not, and is compelled to discount them as “naïve.”

One needs to learn how to say, “so it is” with neither swagger nor self-abasement.

ON “REALISM”

In the prologue to The Enchantments of Mammon: How Capitalism became the Religion of Modernity, Eugene McCarraher says,

Words such as “paradise” or “love” or “communion” are certainly absent from our political vernacular, exluded on account of their “utopian” connotations or their lack of steely-eyed “realism.”  Although this is a book about the past, I have always kept before me its larger contemporary religious, philosophical, and political implications.  The book should make these clear enough; I will only say here that one of my broader intentions is to challenge the canons of “realism,” especially as defined in the “science” of economics.  As the master science of desire in advanced capitalist nations, economics and its acolytes define the parameters of our moral and political imaginations, patrolling the boundaries of possibility and censoring any more generous conception of human affairs.

“Realism” is a deeply ideological word, and in a very negative sense.  “Realism,” in other words, says more and other than what it pretends to say.

“Realism” pretends that it refers simply to “that which simply is, or that which is possible.”  But we all know, given the countless times we have heard the word used and in its usual contexts, that what is or what is possible as designated by “realism” always has to do with what we wish were not real, that which thwarts our desires, or that which simply can’t live up to them.

“Realism” is invariably linked to some reality (present or possible) that cannot be what we wish of it.  “Realism” has to do with telling us we cannot get what we want, and that we may as well accept this fact.

What are we saying if we tell someone to “be realistic”?  We are almost certainly not telling him or her to see that the situation is or will become much better than he or she imagines.  Almost certainly we are trying to say that things are worse than this person has imagined, or will be worse than our addressee hopes.

So what am I saying?  Simply this: that “realism” is a subtle, powerful, and very commonly used ideological battleaxe deployed not only to diminish hope in a given context—indeed, in the name of honesty, one might well be justified in doing this sometimes—but to assault hope in principle.  The sinister and dishonest ideology of “realism” is that it equates reality with thwarted needs or desires; it subtly curses the positive, the good things in life, with the label of unreality: if something is good, even if it is undeniably extant (and “realism” is always very reluctant to see the good, literally blinds itself in its presence) that good is somehow not real.

In effect, we have what might be described as a kind of dystopic Platonism.  Only the negative, the regrettable, is entirely real in this rhetoric.

And what could be more useful to a society that wants to destroy hope at every turn?  What could be more useful to a society that wants millionaires and billionaires to be in charge and desires that no one will ever question this self-evidently absurd and unjust situation?

ON THE RHETORIC OF “PRIVILEGE”

Before the word “privilege” was recently coined as the prefix to words like “white,” “male,” or “able-bodied,” before the word “privilege” had any political connotation, there was already a whispering of the word “undeserved” as privilege’s prefix.  There was already a simpering attached to “privilege,” such that whenever anyone claimed to have a privilege, he or she was bowing the head just a bit, acknowledging, even if not explicitly or consciously, a kind of shameful failure: one had received what one had not earned.  One was therefor on the spot, to be watched closely: would the privilege be sufficiently appreciated?  Would enough gratitude be shown?  Would the gift be misused in any way?

Would the freely given gift be paid back?

Of course, “privilege,” by definition, is undeserved.  As is a gift.  If a so-called privilege is deserved or earned, it cannot be a privilege.  But the context, style, and attitude with which the word has been so often expressed connoted (and still connotes) however subtly, a significant but unvoiced disapproval, disappointment at the recipient of said privilege.  (I am still speaking here, of the word’s use in a non-political context).

When the word “privilege” is deployed, what would otherwise be the gifts of love are tainted with accusation, a lack of confidence in the receiver.

With this taint comes the ruination of gratitude.  For “gratitude,” even though there is nothing wrong with the word, and at its basic level it connotes only positive things, is, by its popular usage, another of those simpering words.  “We should be truly grateful” is so often delivered with a tone of “we don’t deserve this; it should not have been given to us.  How worthy the giver therefor, and unworthy are we.  Rejoice now, in your gift!”  The message may even be, “I give you this from sheer love and/or generosity.  But to whom much is given, much will be expected.  And you have probably gotten more than you can live up to.  I have bestowed failure upon you, and debt.  And it is all your fault.”

Such is the way adults often teach children to be grateful, and provoke instead ingratitude.  For how much of a gift or a privilege is that thing which is immediately a reminder of one’s unworthiness? 

Now to the more recent, political meanings of “privilege.”

Privilege, in one sense, is quite real.  Certain dominant groups have things in part or in whole because they were stolen from others.  For example, white people in North America stole massive amounts of land from Indigenous people.  A man in a corporation may get a promotion he is worthy of, but which a female colleague was more worthy of, and was passed over for sexist reasons.

But I often hear certain things described as “privileges” which are actually rights.  For example, take the fact that people who are white will not be pulled over by the police simply because they are white.  Things like this are sometimes referred to as “white privilege,” as if not being harassed by cops was some kind of gift one was not worthy of, as if a truly responsible white person would contrive somehow to be abused by the cops.  Isn’t not being harassed by the police a right?  The injustice in this example is not that white people are not going to be harassed on the basis of their race, but that people of colour are harassed on a racial basis.  The issue is not white privilege, but white supremacy.  If a white person takes the rhetoric of privilege to heart, he or she will feel guilty simply for not being victimized.

Does the rhetoric of privilege make any sense?  I don’t think so.  With this mentality, any good thing you have (such as your rights being respected) that somebody somewhere does not have becomes of itself a moral failure.  No wonder, then, that some people are eager to claim the status of victim for themselves whether they are victims or not.  No, if there is any guilt to be felt in the example of racially motivated police harassment, it is in the performance of the white supremacy, or the failure to oppose it.  I suspect those who use the rhetoric of privilege would agree with this, but the rhetoric itself implies a subtle shift: it broadens the scope of accusation to include things which simply are not moral failures.

There are psychological machinations at work here, and rather than simply disapprove of this rhetoric of privilege, perhaps we need to understand where it comes from.  A capitalist culture prioritizes property rights (first and foremost, of those with the most property) more than any other.  Along with this comes the old work ethic of personal worthiness: I am wealthy because I earned it.  You, on the other hand, deserve your poverty.  A person who may be unmoved by protestations of human rights violations (such as police harassment) either denying they exist or being unconcerned enough to do anything about them, might have a bit of a fire set under his or her ass if, on the other hand, someone says, “you have something you haven’t earned.”  The accusation of “white privilege” is very effective at this.  The rhetoric of privilege has an emotional force to it.  The person who does not feel responsible for the police harassment, or who may be unmoved by the statement, “it is your responsibility to help me defend my rights” may well be galled and/or morally intimidated by language which says, “you are a freeloader, one who reaps where he has not sown.  You are, in the moral sphere, a thief, a bum.”  Whether this person is then wracked by guilt and becomes an ally, or defiantly berates “woke culture,” he or she has at least been forced into some attempt at self-justification.

And the accusation of “Privilege” is a secular equivalent to some conceptions of original sin.  You needn’t actually sin through your own choices to be guilty—neither a sin of omission, nor commission.  You need only to belong to a privileged group, one which you may never have had any choice about belonging to.  The problem with certain kinds of privilege is that one is born to them—given what the historical and cultural context is–and cannot give them away.  The accuser is smug in the knowledge of pinning on you a crime you are surely guilty of but did not commit.  One can decide not to engage in racism, one can decide to fight it, and one can be justly judged on the basis of whether one does or not.  But one cannot give up “white privilege.”

Some measure of so-called “white fragility” (though I think not most of it) can be explained by this mind-fucking rhetoric: few things are more exasperating than an accusation that in one sense is irrefutable, but which points to an offense that is either not a real offense, or one that one could not help committing.  How many preachers over the centuries, for example, have angrily furrowed their brows at their congregations and accused them in effect of not being pre-lapsarian?  People have enough to feel genuinely guilty about without the volume being turned up on the survivor’s guilt, which is a psychological, not a moral category.

So you are damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.  Those who put you in this rhetorical bind are probably trying to replicate for you in a small way their own experiences as members of marginalized groups.  Now, one may choose to commend this action as morally salutary or deplore it as small minded and dishonest.  But let us at least see clearly how the mechanism works.

A focus on “privilege” in its political context takes righteous anger and undercuts it by resentment; the legitimate and righteous complaint made by a genuine victim is twisted into sounding like the whining of a failure.  “You have stolen from me” becomes the voice of Envy as in Marlowe’s Faustus: “I am lean with watching others eat.”

In response, the victimizer (for example, white supremacy again) rubs his hands with glee: “Oh look!  Resentment!  Didn’t Nietzsche speak of this?  For shame!”  This development parallels on a cultural level what often happens on a political one: a violent and oppressive group fails to respond to peaceful demands for change; some of the oppressed eventually take up violence against the oppressor, and the latter in a fit of moral ecstasy decries the heavily provoked violence which is actually much smaller than the unprovoked violence of the oppressive group itself.  Thus do the champions of the “anti-woke” make full use of the small-mindedness of privilege rhetoric to once again make the relatively innocent David look like the wicked Goliath.  We have seen the term “politically correct” deployed for the last thirty years to make any attempt at equality and justice for the marginalized look like some kind of tyranny on the part of a terrifying liberalism that has had everything its own way.  But nothing has been more politically correct than not being politically correct.

The reader will have concluded that I do not at all care for the rhetoric of “privilege.”  It muddies the waters.  It makes silly accusations while overlooking very clear and serious ones which the accusers must understand better than anyone.  But I suspect much of the root of this rhetoric is the persistent and truculent attitudes of dominant and exploitative groups resisting change.  So much injustice has not been properly addressed or resolved, or in many cases admitted.  By and large the rhetoric of privilege is an angry attempt, made by thwarted and abused people, to get a little revenge against systems far too slow to stop their own much larger injustices.

AGAINST “REALISM”

“Realism” is one of those intractably ideological words that have a tendency to speak the speaker rather than being spoken by him or her.  People have a tendency to use this word with a lot of swagger, little realizing they are sitting on the ventriloquist’s knees, speaking his words, without even knowing he exists.  This has happened so often that the swagger is actually built in now.  You cannot say “be realistic” without swaggering any more than you can say “fuck off” politely.

In short, “realistic” and “realism” are ideological words.

One usually says, “be realistic” to people whose perceptions of a situation are seen as too optimistic.  Very seldom is exaggerated pessimism told to “be realistic.”  Why is this?  Isn’t exaggerated fearfulness as far from reality as exaggerated hope?  Somehow the word “realism” has become loaded with pessimism, with a belief that what is most real is somehow necessarily not how we would like it to be.  In other words, the good can never be as “real” as the bad.  A bad situation is very real, but a good one is somehow imaginary, ephemeral, wishful thinking.  We are going beyond the statement that there is more bad than good in life, and towards a view that says the good can only ever be, in some vague sense, ghostly—unreal.  Something like an inverted Platonism has crept into our language and thought.

Strictly speaking, “real” simply means that which is–good, bad, or indifferent.  So linking this neutral word with connotations of a darker, more pessimistic (even cynical) sort implies a darker and cynical approach to the world generally: an approach that says that which is not the way we want it to be is somehow more “real” than things we like or love.  All that is good or deeply desirable is looked upon in a patronizing manner.  To be “realistic,” therefor, is to pretend to be neutral while promoting a very non-neutral view about the nature of reality.

From a Christian perspective (but not only from that perspective) “realism” is not pessimism, but defeatism, even collaboration with the darker angels of the world.  (Simple pessimism is more honest, and even justifiable at times.  It does not amount to a sneaky, cosmological/ideological move like “realism” does.)  The news, after all, is good, according to the gospels.  If there is anything that is less than real, it is evil, not good, despite the power and pervasiveness of the former.  In The Great Divorce, C.S. Lewis, hardly a man to underestimate the power and extent of evil, likens heaven to a kind of hyper-reality where waterfalls are too loud for ordinary human ears, and the grass is too hard to walk on comfortably until one gets used to it.  Those in hell (or maybe it was purgatory?  I do not remember) when given a holiday in heaven, find the light hurts their eyes and themselves to be barely visible, like shadows or heat waves on the horizon.

Pilate was a “realist” when he murdered Jesus.  “What is truth?” he asks.  This might seem like a fine and thoughtful philosophical question, one which comes to mind only for sensitive and thoughtful souls, or tragic figures trying to understand their fate: the faithful servants of emperors “only trying to do their job” and trapped in unpalatable situations that “unrealistic” people do not understand.  Some commentators have seen the Bible’s portrayal of Pilate here as antisemitic in its attempt to show Pilate in as positive a light as possible, thereby blaming the death of Christ as much as possible on the Jews.  I do not know if this criticism of the Bible is true or not, but I do remember years ago seeing Pilate in this same light: that is, as a man trying to do the right thing, but somehow “tragically flawed”: less a sinner than his reputation paints him.

But now I see him, in his question about truth, as performing a standard politician’s gambit:  when you are about to do a rotten and clearly unjustifiable thing, a thing you haven’t been forced to do either, play the role of the figure so exalted and wise that he sees reasons for his misdeeds that are beyond the comprehension of the vulgar and judgemental masses.  “What is truth?” asks Pilate, as if he has an excuse for crucifying the truth because of his rectitude in admitting he is too scrupulous to pretend he knows it.  The irony of Pilate’s “what is truth” is not that a sensitive and thoughtful man will now do a bad thing quite contrary to his noble intentions, but that the truth he is asking for is standing before him, about to be crucified by him, and he cannot or will not see him.

Maybe Pilate was putting truth on hold because he was a man of “reality.”  There is a profound difference in having “reality” as the master referent, as opposed to “truth.”  For reality is simply about what IS.  Truth includes that, but is also about what OUGHT to be.  In that sense, reality is only a subset of truth.  Those who swagger and tell us to “get back to reality” are really trying to blind us to truth.

Perhaps the difference between a religious and a secular view is this: in the former, what OUGHT to be is as much a reality as what IS, however much painfully unmanifested in the realm of IS.  For secularity, there is only what is.

CAPITALIST ECONOMIC TERMINOLOGY AND RHETORIC

How do we discuss economics in our society?  Consider this from Michael Harrington’s Socialism: Past and Future (1989):

“But those Keynesian concepts and statistics are value-laden.  “Gross National Product” is, after all, truly a gross measure and certainly a very capitalist one.  It assumes that any activity that yields a profit – be it the production of carcinogenic cigarettes or automobile engines that contribute to acid rain – is to be given a positive weight.  If the GNP goes up, no matter what its composition, it is thought that the society is advancing.  But that advance could well be a stride toward catastrophe, for example, toward a greenhouse effect that will threaten life itself.” (p. 217 Arcade Publishing 2011 edition)

This quotation here is evidence of how biased the culture is in favour of capitalism, how ignorant (to be generous) are those allegations from the Right that we are too socialist, when even the language of economics is geared away from socialism towards the values of capitalism.  Popular culture and corporate media do not discuss economics except in the terms that are useful to capitalism and imply that capitalist economics and economics in general are one and the same thing.  Unless we see this and step out of the capitalist frame of reference, our discussions of economics will always be biased in favour of the wealthy and powerful, viewing the world through their eyes while assuming our approach is ideologically neutral.

In addition, the rhetoric of capitalism constantly portrays it as the wild and risk-taking swashbuckler of economic systems, the very opposite of life under Stalin, where “the basic decisions with regard to work, production, and consumption were made by a centralized bureaucracy” (226).  Harrington continues:

“If, a believable joke reported, a Soviet pin factory was assigned a quota of so many tons of pins, it would turn out one monstrously large and unusable pin; and if it were told to produce a certain number of pins, it would achieve the numerical goal with a myriad of pins so thin that they were also useless.” (227)

It is easy enough to see the absurdity of such a practice.  But is it indeed any more absurd than the GNP fetish Harrington in effect describes?  We see here the Soviet and capitalist versions of what are essentially bureaucratic and robotic mentalities.  Truly, Noam Chomsky’s frequent condemnation of both camps, with their managerial arrogance, is not misplaced.